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Abstract—In an ideal network, every packet would be at-
tributable to its sender, while host identities and transmitted
content would remain private. Designing such a network is
challenging because source accountability and communication
privacy are typically viewed as conflicting properties. In this
paper, we propose an architecture that guarantees source ac-
countability and privacy-preserving communication by enlisting
ISPs as accountability agents and privacy brokers. While ISPs
can link every packet in their network to their customers,
customer identity remains unknown to the rest of the Internet. In
our architecture, network communication is based on Ephemeral
Identifiers (EphIDs)—cryptographic tokens that can be linked to
a source only by the source’s ISP. We demonstrate that EphIDs
can be generated and processed efficiently, and we analyze the
practical considerations for deployment.
I. INTRODUCTION
The commercialization of the Internet and its integral role
in our daily lives have spawned a debate on privacy and
accountability—a long-standing discussion about two proper-
ties that are typically considered conflicting. Unfortunately,
today’s Internet does not provide native support for either. We
propose an architecture that resolves the accountability-privacy
tussle and guarantees network-level source accountability and
end-to-end communication privacy.
On one end of the spectrum, source accountability protects
the integrity of the source’s identity and holds the source
responsible for any traffic that it originates. The lack of
source accountability has become a Pandora’s box for Internet
security. Attackers spoof their addresses and launch massive
reflection attacks exhausting the available network resources.
IP source address spoofing makes it impossible to identify
the actual attacker and renders traffic filtering ineffective, not
to mention the collateral damage when incorrectly blocking
benign hosts.
On the other end of the spectrum is privacy. Recent rev-
elations of pervasive monitoring and mass surveillance [15]
have increased user awareness of communication privacy.
Users know that their identities and network traffic are being
systematically collected by state-level entities. The lack of
native support for private communication in the Internet forces
users to rely on overlay networks and specialized applications
to obtain privacy guarantees [34]. These solutions are complex
to install and manage, and degrade application performance.
To date, the research community has mainly investigated
approaches that favor either privacy or accountability, typically
offering one at the expense of the other. To our knowledge,
the Accountable and Private Internet Protocol (APIP) is the
main proposal that has aimed to find a balance between the
two properties at the network layer [30]. However, the privacy
guarantees are constrained to source anonymity; data privacy
is not addressed but delegated to conventional protocols, such
as IPsec [21] and its key exchange protocol (IKE [19]) that
in themselves do not explicity address a critical problem:
certificate management (e.g., issuance, revocation) at Internet-
scale.
In this paper, we propose an Accountable and Private
Network Architecture (APNA) that provides strong source
accountability guarantees and privacy-preserving communi-
cation. Our notion of communication privacy covers host
privacy (for the source and destination) and data privacy—host
privacy means that the identity (e.g., IP address) of the host
remains private and data privacy means that the transmitted
data remains secret from unintended recipients.
To provide such properties, we enlist Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) as a fundamental component of our architec-
ture for several reasons. First, we build on past efforts to hold
Autonomous Systems (ASes) accountable for malicious traffic
generated within their domain [24], [37]. Second, we believe
ISPs have business incentives to provide privacy features
to their customers, especially in light of recent revelations
regarding global surveillance. While ISPs facilitate connection
establishment between communicating peers, encryption of
traffic is still performed directly by communication endpoints,
keeping the content of the communication hidden even from
the ISPs that provides Internet connection to the peers.
In our scheme, network communication is based on
Ephemeral Identifiers (EphIDs) instead of long-lived network
addresses, such as IP addresses. ASes issue EphIDs and
assign them to their customer hosts as tokens of approval for
communication. EphIDs are designed to mask the host address
in the network, providing host privacy, while still providing a
return address. Preserving the return address enables ICMP
to function correctly in our scheme. In addition, EphIDs are
bound to short-lived and domain-certified public/private key
pairs. These keys are used by hosts to negotiate a shared secret
key, which allows native payload secrecy through network-
layer traffic encryption.
The privacy architecture proposed in this paper, which es-
tablishes shared keys based on EphIDs, by default encrypts all
payload data. Pervasive encryption frustrates large-scale traffic
analysis by obfuscating all communicated content. Moreover,
payloads are encrypted with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)
such that an adversary that obtains all long-term keys cannot
decrypt the content of previous communication sessions.
EphIDs are cryptographically linked to the identity of a
host and serve as accountability units. ISPs issue and assign
EphIDs only to their authenticated customers, thus boot-
strapping source accountability. We argue that ISPs are the
natural accountability agents in today’s Internet since they
already know the identities of their customers. Furthermore,
we describe a shutoff protocol [4], which is a common security
mechanism relying on source accountability. A complaining
destination-host instructs an ISP to block outgoing traffic
from a customer-host that is associated with an EphID. The
accountable identifiers allow an ISP first to verify that a
customer has sent traffic to a certain destination and then to
terminate any further communication.
Contributions. This paper proposes a cohesive architecture,
Accountable and Private Network Architecture (APNA), that
simultaneously guarantees accountability and privacy by in-
volving ASes as accountability agents and privacy brokers. In
particular, APNA achieves the following properties:
• Source accountability by linking every packet in the
network to its originating source.
• Host privacy by hiding the host’s identity from every
entity except the host’s AS.
• Data privacy by supporting network-layer encryption with
perfect forward secrecy.
• Support for feedback from the network back to the source
(e.g., ICMP).
• Support for a shutoff protocol that terminates unwanted
communication sessions.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Our goal is to design a network architecture that simul-
taneously supports source accountability while preserving
communication privacy. This section describes the necessary
requirements to realize these seemingly conflicting goals, the
security properties we strive to achieve, and the adversary
models we consider. Throughout the paper we consider that the
AS of the source host deploys APNA; and in Section VIII-E,
we describe how an upstream ISP of the AS can provide
APNA functionalities to the host.
A. Source Accountability
Source accountability refers to an unforgeable link between
the identity of a sender and the sent packet. Thus, account-
ability ensures that a source cannot deny having sent a packet
and a host cannot be falsely accused of having sent a packet
which it did not send.
Achieving source accountability in practice translates to
two fundamental requirements. First, a strong notion of host
identity is necessary so that hosts cannot create multiple
identities nor impersonate other hosts. Second, a link between
the source’s identity and all of its traffic must be established.
This link must be established (or at least confirmed) by a
third-party (e.g., source AS) that is not the sender itself, since
senders can be malicious. To this end, the third party must
observe all of the sender’s traffic such that every packet in the
network can be linked to a specific sender.
Adversary Model. The goal of the adversary is to break
source accountability by creating a packet that is attributed to
someone else in the network. We assume that the adversary
can reside in multiple ASes and that he can see all packets
within those ASes. Specifically, the adversary can eavesdrop
on all control and data messages in the network, but cannot
compromise the secret keys of the AS.
B. Communication Privacy
Our first goal with respect to privacy at the network layer
is host privacy. To achieve host privacy, the identity of a host
must be hidden from any other host in the source AS that is
not in the same broadcast domain (e.g., WiFi network, or LAN
segment) as the host,1 any transit network that forwards traffic,
as well as the destination AS (including the communication
peer). A host cannot hide from its AS, since the AS knows the
identity and network attachment point of every customer. We
address host privacy at the network layer, which means that
network-layer headers should not leak identity information.
A host’s identity may still leak at higher layers (e.g., HTTP
cookies); however, these aspects are out of scope for this paper.
In addition, our notion of host privacy includes sender-flow
unlinkability [32]: simply by observing packet contents (both
headers and payloads) of any number of flows originating from
the same AS, the creator(s) of the flows are no more and no
less related after the observation than they were before the
observation.
Our second goal is data privacy through pervasive end-
to-end encryption. Transmitted data should be hidden from
unintended recipients, including the source and destination
ASes. To this end, the architecture must natively (i.e., without
relying on upper-layer protocols) provide secure key establish-
ment between hosts and protection against Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM) attacks.
Moreover, our notion of data privacy includes perfect for-
ward secrecy (PFS): disclosure of long-term secret keying
material does not compromise the secrecy of exchanged keys
from past sessions and thus data privacy of prior communica-
tion sessions is guaranteed [28, p. 496].
Adversary Model: Breaking host privacy means that an
adversary can determine the identity of a sender, or can
determine if two flows from the same source AS originate
from the same host. We assume that the adversary can control
any entity in the Internet except for the source host, hosts
that are in the same broadcast domain as the source host, and
1Note that we exclude hosts in the same broadcast domain as the host since
these hosts know the Layer 2 address of the host.
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the source AS. The adversary can observe packet headers and
content, but we do not consider timing analysis techniques,
such as inter-packet arrival times.
We argue that the architecture should provide only the basic
building blocks to achieve host privacy at the network layer;
and, for stronger privacy guarantees (e.g., resiliency against
timing analysis), protocols at a higher layer (e.g., transport
protocol) should provide such guarantees. For instance, a
transport protocol could implement a packet scheduling al-
gorithm that homogenizes timing between packets to prevent
traffic identification algorithms based on inter-packet timing
analysis [18]. Our argument is grounded by the fact that strong
privacy guarantees often come at the expense of network
performance, and not every user (or application) requires
strong privacy guarantees. Hence, protocols that offer stronger
privacy guarantees are left to upper layers so that users can
choose the appropriate protocol based on their requirements.
An adversary can try to compromise data privacy by de-
crypting the content of a communication session between two
hosts. To this end, we assume that the adversary can control
any entity in the Internet except for the two communicating
hosts and one of the two ASes that the hosts reside in.
C. Additional Goals
Shutoff Functionality. An accountability architecture must
provide security mechanisms that build on top of accountable
addresses. A shutoff mechanism is commonly used to termi-
nate any active communication session flagged for misbehav-
ior. The architecture must ensure that the shutoff mechanism
does not create other attack vectors, such as denial of service
through non-permitted shutoff requests.
ICMP Support. The architecture should not sacrifice ICMP
in favor of privacy due to its importance in the Internet. It
is the Swiss army knife for network operators and is used
for multiple purposes—from availability testing (e.g., ping)
to network debugging (e.g., traceroute) and to performance
optimizations (e.g., MTU discovery).
III. APNA OVERVIEW
This section describes the components of our Accountable
and Private Network Architecture (APNA), beginning with
the role of the ASes (Section III-A), followed by the use of
ephemeral identifiers (Section III-B), and ending with an end-
to-end communication example (Section III-C).
A. Role of ASes
In APNA, ASes act both as accountability agents and as
privacy brokers due to their position in the network. Since
ASes already know the identity and the physical attachment
point of their customers, they naturally act as accountability
agents. At the same time, ASes mask their customers’ identi-
ties from all other entities, and thus act as host-privacy brokers.
In addition, ASes certify their customer-related information
(e.g., public keys), which is then used to generate keys for
pervasive data encryption at the network layer; thus ASes act
as data-privacy brokers. We describe about each role in more
detail in the following paragraphs.
Accountability Functions. As an accountability agent, the
AS performs the following functions.
First, the AS creates a strong notion of host identity. To
this end, the AS ensures that subscribers do not create and
use multiple unauthorized identities for their communication.
ASes already authenticate their customers and are thus selected
as accountability agents.
Second, the AS creates a link between the identity of the
source and the sent packet. To this end, the AS can store
every packet or insert a cryptographic mark into every packet.
Regardless of the implementation, the AS is on the forwarding
path of all the traffic originating from its customers and
is therefore selected to establish this link. Using any other
third party as an accountability agent would require additional
mechanisms to report every packet to the third party [30].
Third, the AS realizes the shutoff functionality by accepting
(and validating) shutoff requests and blocking the correspond-
ing flows. An AS is in a strategic position to block malicious
traffic since it is close to the source and can stop traffic before
it leaves its network.
Privacy Functions. As a privacy broker, the AS performs
the following functions.
First, the AS masks the identity of its customer hosts by
replacing the source address with an ephemeral identifier
(EphID). This identifier serves as a privacy-preserving return
address and thus does not break bidirectional communication.
However, EphIDs must be bound to specific hosts and since
ASes know the identities of the hosts, they are well suited
to perform this binding and act as host-privacy brokers. We
provide more details on EphIDs in Section III-B.
Second, the AS acts as a certificate issuer, certifying that a
public key indeed belongs to a host in the AS’s network. More
specifically, the AS certifies the binding between an ephemeral
identifier that is issued to a host and an ephemeral public key
that is bound to the identifier. Hence, the AS becomes a data-
privacy broker without revealing the identity of its customers.
B. Ephemeral IDs
At the heart of our proposal is the use of ephemeral
identifiers instead of addresses. An EphID is an identifier
associated with the identity of a host, yet it does not leak
identity information. Since ASes know the identities of their
customers, issuing EphIDs to their connected hosts enables the
hosts to hide their identity without sacrificing accountability.
EphID as an Accountability Unit. As an accountability
unit, an EphID is an authorization token for communication
that is issued by the AS to its customer hosts. Issuing these
tokens requires strong host authentication: the host must first
prove its identity to the AS and only then EphIDs can be
issued.
In APNA, a host is represented to its AS through a Host
Identifier (HID). An HID could be a hash of the host’s public
key or a number that is assigned by the AS to the host (e.g.,
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IPv4 address). We do not specify how an AS assigns HIDs, but
require that HIDs be unique within the AS’s boundary. There
can be multiple EphIDs that are associated with an HID, and
the EphIDs are cryptographically bound to the HID such that
only the host AS can determine the binding. Furthermore, an
EphID serves as the accountability unit for shutoff requests.
A shutoff request against an EphID terminates all flows of
the host that use that EphID as the source identifier. In other
words, flows with the same source EphID are fate-sharing with
respect to the shutoff protocol. Blacklisting source EphIDs
instead of source and destination EphID pairs forces hosts to
carefully manage their pool of assigned EphIDs.
EphID as a Privacy Unit. The EphID has two roles as a
privacy unit: it hides the identity of a host and provides a tool
to achieve sender-flow unlinkability. An EphID is meaningful
only to the issuing AS and opaque to all other parties. It
reveals no information about the host’s identity to other hosts
inside the same AS nor to the peer host that the host is
communicating with.
EphIDs alone are insufficient for routing packets to a
destination, since location information is missing. Therefore,
a host is fully addressed by an AID:EphID tuple. The AID
identifies the AS in which the host resides (e.g., Autonomous
System Number) and the EphID is the ephemeral identifier
issued to the host by the corresponding AS. Hence, the only
leaked information is the AS where the host resides and the
host’s anonymity set becomes the size of the AS in terms of
number of hosts.
In addition, decoupling the identity from the address pro-
vides a means to achieve sender-flow unlinkability. A host
can be issued multiple EphIDs and can use them at will, e.g.,
a single EphID for all flows or a different EphID for every
flow. We do not impose any requirements on how EphIDs
are assigned. We discuss different granularities of EphIDs in
Section VIII-A.
C. Communication Example
We describe the high-level workflow for communication be-
tween two hosts (Figure 1). The protocol details are provided
in Section IV.
The following logical entities are present in every AS:
• Registry Service (RS): authenticates and bootstraps hosts
to the AS.
• Management Service (MS): issues EphIDs to the hosts.
• Border Router (BR): handles incoming and outgoing
packets based on the AID:EphID tuple.
• Accountability Agent (AA): handles shutoff requests
against the hosts in the AS.
In Figure 1, a host in AIDA is trying to communicate with
a host in AIDB. Communication proceeds in four steps:
1) Host Bootstrapping: the host authenticates to its AS
and receives bootstrapping information from its AS.
2) EphID Issuance: the host contacts the MS of its AS to
obtain an EphID.
3) Connection Establishment: the hosts know each other’s
AID:EphID identifiers and establish a shared key that
will be used for network-layer data encryption. The
shared key is derived from public keys that are asso-
ciated with the EphIDs. In Section VII-A, we describe
how hosts can obtain the necessary communication
information through DNS.
4) Encrypted Communication: the hosts proceed with
the actual communication by using the corresponding
AID:EphID tuples instead of network addresses and by
encrypting every packet with their shared symmetric key.
IV. APNA PROTOCOL DETAILS
We aim to construct a lightweight architecture that avoids
keeping large amount of state on network nodes and uses sym-
metric cryptography for data transmission. More specifically,
we make the following design choices in APNA:
1) symmetric encryption is used to cryptographically link
EphIDs with HIDs; this allows an AS to efficiently
obtain the HID from the EphID without a mapping table,
which can be large;
2) proof of sending a packet is embedded in the packet,
avoiding (excessive) storage overhead for ASes;
3) forwarding devices perform only symmetric crypto-
graphic operations, guaranteeing high forwarding per-
formance.
We begin by stating our assumptions, and proceed with the
details of the steps that are shown in our example communica-
tion scenario in Section III-C (see Fig. 1). Table I summarizes
the notation we use throughout the protocol description.
A. Assumptions
• We assume that the cryptographic primitives we use
are secure. For instance, we assume that the encryption
scheme that protects data communication is CCA-secure.
Hence, the adversary without an encryption key cannot
learn anything about the protected plaintext from the
corresponding ciphertext, and any modification to the
ciphertext by the adversary is detected by the commu-
nicating hosts. For encrypting data communication, any
conventional CCA-secure scheme [27], [36] can be used.
Note that we also require that the generation of EphIDs
to be CCA-secure, and in Section V-A1, we describe a
CCA-secure encryption scheme for generating EphIDs.
• Participating parties can retrieve and verify the public
keys of ASes. For example, a scheme such as RPKI [5]
can be used to verify the public keys of the corresponding
ASes. In addition, for simplicity, ASes use the same
public/private key pairs for 1) signing messages and
2) key exchanges. In a real-world deployment, these two
keys would be different, and the key used for signing
messages would be registered with RPKI.
• Hosts do not use connection sharing devices (e.g., NAT).
In other words, each host is directly visible to its AS. We
relax this assumption in Section VII-B.
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1. Host
Bootstrapping (§IV-B)
2. EID
Issuance (§IV-C)
ASA (AIDA)
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ASB (AIDB)
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AAAA
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Fig. 1: An end-to-end communication example.
kAi Symmetric key known among the infrastructure (e.g.,
routers, RS, MS, AA) within ASi
kHiAi Symmetric key shared between host Hi and its AS(ASi)
kEiE j Symmetric key generated for the EphID pair Ei and
E j
HIDi Host identifier (HID) assigned to host Hi
E phIDh An EphID issued to host H
CHi ,CEi Certificate for host Hi and EphID Ei respectively
K+E ,K
−
E Public, private key of entity E
MACK (M) Message M along with MAC of M using symmetric
key K
{M}K− Message M along with Signature of M using private-
key K−
Ek(M) Symmetric encryption of M with key k
E−1k (C) Symmetric decryption of C with key k
TABLE I: Notation.
B. Host Bootstrapping
Initially, a host authenticates to its AS and the bootstrapping
procedure follows thereafter. Note that host authentication is
the first step towards establishing source accountability and
is an operation that every AS already performs. We do not
specify how the host authenticates itself to the AS since
well-established authentication protocols exist [13], [35]. For
example, an AS can require a user to authenticate using login
credentials that are created when the user subscribes to the
AS. During the authentication process, we assume that the
AS learns the public key of the host (K+H ).
Once the host has successfully authenticated, the Registry
Service (RS) of the AS performs the bootstrapping procedure
(Figure 2). During this procedure, the host receives infor-
mation about its AS’s services that are necessary to (later)
establish communication sessions; and to support these com-
munication sessions, the infrastructure of the AS gets updated
with the host’s information. We require that all bootstrapping
messages are authenticated in order to avoid modifications en
route.
First, the RS establishes two shared symmetric keys with
the host. One key is used to encrypt EphID request and
reply messages (Section IV-C), and the other key is used to
authenticate every packet that the host creates and injects to
the network. The two keys are computed by first performing a
Diffie-Hellman (DH) exchange using the public/private key
pairs of the host and his AS, and then deriving the two
keys from the result of the DH exchange. Throughout the
discussion, for simplicity, we denote both keys as kHA.
Next, the RS creates a control EphID (E phIDctrlh ) for the
host. The host uses the control EphID to access the AS’s
services. For instance, using his E phIDctrlh , the host accesses
the MS to request data-plane EphIDs. Both control and data-
plane EphIDs are constructed identically (See IV-C), but they
are used differently and have different expiration times. A con-
trol EphID is used for communication with the AS’s internal
services and has longer lifetime (e.g., DHCP lease time) while
a data-plane EphID is mainly used for data communication
and is valid for the duration of a communication session.
Using the same construction for both EphID types simplifies
communication in APNA: all communication is based on
EphIDs. For the paper, we use the term EphIDs to refer to
the data-plane EphIDs.
The RS returns the following information to the host:
the control EphID (E phIDctrlh ) with its expiration time
(ExpTime), and the certificates for the MS (E phIDms) and
DNS (E phIDdns) services. These certificates contain EphIDs,
which are used as the destination identifiers to access the
corresponding services, the expiration times for the EphIDs,
and the public keys that are associated with the respective
EphIDs.
Finally, the RS sends the host information (HID, kHA) to
infrastructure entities in the AS (e.g., routers, MS, AA); the
entities store the information in their database (host in f o).
The infrastructure of the AS must learn the host information in
order to handle packets that are originating from and destined
to this host. Specifically, the entities need to learn the HID of
the host (HID) and the shared key (kHA) with the host so that
they can verify the authenticity of the packets that originate
from the host.
C. Ephemeral ID Issuance
An EphID is an encrypted token using the AS’s secret key
(kA); it contains the host’s HID and an expiration time that
indicates the validity period for the EphID (Equation 1). Note
that the use of encryption enables the issuing AS to obtain
the HID and expiration time from an EphID in a stateless
fashion, without an additional mapping table; this allows an
AS to handle an arbitrary number of EphIDs at a constant
cost.
E phID = EkA(HID, ExpTime) (1)
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AS Entities : All infrastructures (e.g., border routers, MS) of the AS
g,p : DH Parameters, a : A random DH Secret Integer
generateHID() : Generate a unique HID
setExpTime() : Create Expiration Time
verifySig(K+,M) : Verifies signature of message M using K+
Host RS AS Entities
RS authenticates Host
RS retrieves HID for Host
Host sends its K+H to RS
kHA = (K+H )
K−AS mod p
host in f o[HID] = kHA
E phIDctrlh = EkA (HID,ExpTime)
id in f o = {E phIDctrlh ,ExpTime}K−AS
m1 = EkA (HID,kHA)
m2 ={id in f o,CE phIDdns ,CE phIDms}
m2 m1
(HID,kHA) = E−1kA (m1)
host in f o[HID] = kHA
veri f ySig(K+AS, id in f o)
kHA = (K+AS)
K−H mod p
Fig. 2: Procedure for Host Bootstrapping.
Every EphID is associated with a public/private key pair
(K+E phID,K−E phID), which serves two purposes: 1) to create
a shared key with a peer host for data encryption (Sec-
tion IV-D1), and 2) to authenticate shutoff requests (Sec-
tion IV-E). Since the key pair is used by the host to create
a data encryption key that is kept secret from the AS, it is
generated by the host.
The AS certifies the binding between an EphID and a
public/private key pair by issuing a short-lived certificate
(CE phID) that has the same expiration time as the EphID. From
the certificate, a peer host learns the public key (K+E phID) that
is associated to the EphID as well as the expiration time for
the EphID. In addition to the information about the EphID,
the certificate contains information about the issuing AS—the
AID and the EphID of the accountability agent (E phIDaa).
The agent’s EphID is used by a peer host (with which the
requesting host communicates) to initiate the shutoff protocol
when necessary.
To obtain an EphID, the host creates and sends an EphID
request message to the MS. Specifically, the host first generates
the public/private key pair (K+E phID,K−E phID) for the EphID and
includes K+E phID in the request message. In addition, the host
uses E phIDctrlh as the source address for the request message
and encrypts the message using the shared key with the AS
(kHA). The message is encrypted to hide it from other entities
in the AS that are not part of the AS infrastructure. If an
adversary who tries to compromise sender-flow unlinkability
(for the description of the adversary model, see Section II-B)
can see the content of EphID request packets, he can identify a
common sender across multiple flows at the level of E phIDctrlh
as the initial packets to establish connections between two
hosts contain K+E phID information for key negotiation purposes
(Section IV-D1). That is, the adversary learns the (E phIDctrlh ,
K+E phID) pair from EphID request packets and searches for
connection establishment packets that contain K+E phIDs that
maps to the same E phIDctrlh . Note that the adversary has
Host (E phIDctrlh ) MS (E phIDms)
(K+E phID,K
−
E phID) = (g
amod p,a)
EkHA (K
+
E phID)
(HID,T1) = E−1kA (E phID
ctrl
h )
if T1 < currTime abort
if HID /∈ host in f o abort
kHA = host in f o[HID]
K+E phID = E
−1
kHA
(EkHA (K
+
E phID))
E phID = EkA (HID,ExpTime)
CE phID = {E phID,ExpTime,K+E phID ,AIDAS ,E phIDaa}K−AS
EkHA (CE phID)
Fig. 3: Procedure for EphID Issuance.
not compromised the host identity since only the host’s AS
can extract host identity from E phIDctrlh . Nonetheless, he has
successfully identified a common sender across multiple flows.
In APNA, encrypting the EphID request message prevents
such attacks.
Upon receiving the request, the MS validates the authentic-
ity of the request; decrypts the source EphID (E phIDctrlh ); and
performs the following checks: 1) E phIDctrlh has not expired,
2) the client’s identifier (HID) is valid (i.e., has not been
revoked), and 3) the message is valid (i.e., the message can
be decrypted successfully). If any one of the checks fails, the
request is dropped.
Then, the MS proceeds with the EphID issuance: it gener-
ates an EphID and creates the short-lived certificate (CE phID)
for the EphID. Finally, the MS encrypts the certificate and
sends it to the requesting host. The certificate is encrypted so
that an adversary cannot relate different EphIDs to the control
EphID of the requesting host by observing the content of the
EphID reply packets.
D. Data Communication
To communicate, two hosts first generate a shared sym-
metric key for their communication session. This key is then
used to encrypt all traffic that belongs to this communication
session. We emphasize that two hosts can create multiple
communication sessions and each session has a different
symmetric key to ensure that disclosure of one encryption key
does not compromise data privacy of other communication
sessions. We provide further details.
1) Connection Establishment: For every connection estab-
lishment between a pair of hosts, the two hosts perform the
following tasks: 1) verify each other’s EphID certificate that is
issued by their corresponding ASes, and 2) establish a shared
key via a DH key exchange to encrypt their communication.
Consider two hosts, A and B, with EphIDs E phIDa and
E phIDb, respectively, that are trying to establish a connection
with each other. Assume that the hosts have obtained each
other’s EphID and the associated certificate (we discuss ob-
taining EphIDs through DNS in Section VII-A). Using the
short-lived certificate of E phIDb and the public-private key
pair associated with E phIDa, A derives a shared key (kEaEb)
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between E phIDa and E phIDb. Similarly, B computes the same
shared key, completing the connection establishment. This
symmetric shared key is then used to encrypt data packets
between the two hosts.
2) Encrypted Communication: After the connection estab-
lishment, communication is based on symmetric cryptographic
operations. First, the host uses the symmetric key that it shares
with the peer to encrypt the packets to the peer. Any existing
CCA-secure encryption scheme can be used. Second, the host
computes a MAC for every packet that it sends, using the
symmetric key that is shared with its AS (kHA). This allows
the host’s AS to link every packet to its source and to drop
packets from (potentially) malicious hosts.
3) Data Forwarding: Forwarding operations at border
routers in source ASes ensure that only packets from au-
thenticated hosts and authorized EphIDs leave the source AS.
Border routers in destination ASes forward packets to the
correct hosts based on the destination EphIDs. Transit ASes do
not perform additional operations and simply forward packets
to the next AS on the path. As per our design choice, only
symmetric cryptographic operations are used, enabling a high-
performance data forwarding.
Recall that communication end-points are specified as
AID:EphID tuples. For inter-domain forwarding, border
routers use AID to forward packets. Specifically, for external
packets entering the AS, an border router checks whether the
packet has arrived at the destination AS. If not, the packet
is forwarded to the neighboring AS towards the destination
AS. At the destination AS, the border router checks the
following conditions: 1) the destination EphID (E phIDd) has
not expired, 2) E phIDd has not been revoked, and 3) HIDD
is valid (i.e., is registered and non-revoked).
If all conditions are satisfied, then the packet is forwarded
to the destination host: border routers derive the corresponding
HID from the EphID and then forward the packet; we assume
that intra-domain routers forward packets based on HIDs (e.g.,
IP addresses).
For outgoing packets, an border router forwards the packets
to a neighboring AS only if all of the following conditions
are satisfied: 1) the source EphID (E phIDs) has not expired,
2) E phIDs has not been revoked, 3) HIDS is valid, and 4) the
MAC in the packet is correct.
To verify the MAC in the packet, an border router retrieves
the shared key (kHA) between the source host and the AS by
searching the host information database (host in f o) using the
HID of the source host as the key. These checks ensure that
only authenticated packets leave the source AS.
E. Shutoff Protocol
Shutoff protocols are designed to allow hosts to selectively
block traffic from specific source hosts. In our architecture, an
accountability agent checks the validity of a shutoff request
and then blocks the source EphID. The agent checks whether
a customer-host has actually sent the specific packet that the
requesting party reports and whether the party is authorized
to make the request (i.e., the requesting host was indeed the
AID : AID of the Destination AS
EphIDs,AIDS : Source EphID and AID in the packet
EphIDd,AIDD : Destination EphID and AID in the packet
revoked ids : List of revoked EphIDs
verifyMAC(k,M) : Verifies MAC of message M using k
Neighbor AS BR
incoming packet
(AIDS : E phIDs →AIDD : E phIDd )
if AIDD == AID
(HIDD,expTime) = E−1kAD
(E phIDd)
if expTime < currTime drop packet; return
if E phIDd ∈ revoked E phIDs drop packet; return
if HIDD /∈ host in f o drop packet; return
intraDomainForward(E phIDd , pkt)
else
interDomainForward(AIDD , pkt)
Host(E phIDs) BR
outgoing packet
(AIDS : E phIDs →AIDD : E phIDd )
(HIDS,expTime) = E−1kAS
(E phIDs)
if expTime < currTime drop packet; return
if E phIDs ∈ revoked E phIDs drop packet; return
if HIDS /∈ host in f o drop packet; return
kHSAS = host in f o[HIDS]
if !veri f yMAC(kHSAS , packet) drop packet; return
interDomainForward(AIDD , packet)
Fig. 4: Procedures for Data Packet Forwarding at Border
Routers for Incoming (Top) and Outgoing (Bottom) Packets.
recipient of the specific packet). The agent does not examine
the intent of the source and whether the packet is malicious.
Figure 5 shows the procedure for the shutoff request: the
destination host that owns E phIDd is attempting to block
traffic coming from E phIDs after receiving a specific packet.
The destination host creates a shutoff request message with the
following information: 1) the received packet, 2) a signature
over the unwanted packet using the private key of E phIDd
(K−E phIDd ), and 3) the certificate of E phIDd . The packet is
included as evidence that the source has indeed sent traffic
to the destination and the shutoff request is not rogue; the
signature and the certificate prove that the destination host
owns E phIDd . Then, the destination host sends the request
message to the accountability agent of the source host.
Upon receiving the request, the accountability agent verifies
the certificate of E phIDd and the signature in the request
message to confirm that the request has indeed been made
by the destination host who owns E phIDd . Then, to ensure
that the packet has been actually generated by the source that
owns E phIDs, the agent checks the authenticity of the packet
using the shared key (kHSAS) with the source host. Finally,
the accountability agent instructs the border routers to revoke
E phIDs by putting it into their revoked ids list.
If misused, the shutoff protocol can be used to launch a DoS
attack against a benign source. To reduce the risk of such DoS
attacks, we only authorize the recipient of a packet to initiate
a shutoff request (i.e., the destination AS and the destination
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EphIDs ,EphIDd : Src/Dst EphIDs in the packet
Dst : Dst Host (i.e., Host that is using E phIDd )
pkt : packet that is sent by the Src Host but unwanted by the Dst Host
AAS ,BRS: Accountability agent, Border Router at Source AS
AAS(E phIDaa) BRS Dst(E phIDd)
pkt
MACkHDAD ({pkt}K−E phIDd
,CE phIDd )
if !veri f yCert(CE phIDd ) abort
if !veri f ySig(K+E phIDd ,{pkt}K−E phIDd
)
abort
(HIDS,T ) = E−1kAS
(E phIDs)
if T < currTime abort
if HIDS /∈ host in f o abort
kHSAS = host in f o[HIDS]
if !veri f yMAC(kHSAS , pkt) abort
MACkAS (revoke E phIDs)
if !veri f yMAC(kAS ,MACkAS (revoke E phIDs))
abort
revoked ids.insert(E phIDs)
Fig. 5: Procedure for Shutoff Protocol.
host that owns the destination EphID). In Section VIII-C, we
discuss how other entities on the communication path can be
authorized to initiate a shutoff request.
V. IMPLEMENTATION & PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We present the implementation and performance evaluation
of the core architecture’s components—the EphID manage-
ment server and an border router.
A. EphID Management Server
The EphID Management Server (MS) is responsible for
generating EphIDs and for assigning them to hosts. The EphID
generation must be efficient since our architecture should sup-
port even per-flow EphIDs. We describe the EphID structure,
the MS implementation, and then evaluate the performance of
the EphID generation procedure.
CBC_MAC
kA''
AES
kA'
EphID:
IV
(4 Bytes)
00…0
(12 Bytes)
HID
(4 Bytes)
ExpTime
(4 Bytes)
00…0
(8 Bytes)
CipherText
(8 Bytes)
IV
(4 Bytes)
00…0
(4 Bytes)
IV
(4 Bytes)
CipherText
(8 Bytes)
MAC
(4 Bytes)
Fig. 6: EphID Construction.
1) EphID Structure: We engineer the EphID length to
optimize for AES processing; AES operates on 16-byte (B)
blocks and is the only cipher with widespread hardware
support.
An EphID requires the HID of the host and an expiration
time (ExpTime). We use 4 B for the HID, which are sufficient
to uniquely represent all hosts even in large ASes. The
expiration time is 4 B long, which allows us to use Unix
timestamps with one second granularity.
Recall that the security requirement for EphIDs is a CCA-
secure encryption scheme. To this end, we use a generic
composition called Encrypt-then-MAC [7] that combines a
symmetric encryption with a message authentication code
(MAC) (Figure 6). First, the concatenation of HID and
ExpTime is encrypted using AES in counter mode. Secure
operation of this mode requires a unique initialization vector
(IV) for every encryption (i.e., for every EphID). Moreover,
the use of the IV allows us to generate multiple EphIDs for
a single HID. Note that the plaintext data is shorter than a
single AES block (16 B) and thus the input must be padded to
16 B; the one-block plaintext requires a single AES operation.
Next, a message authentication tag is computed. The tag
is computed over the first 8 B of the previously generated
ciphertext and the IV that was used in that encryption. We
use CBC-MAC based on AES to generate the authentication
tag.
Finally, the EphID is constructed from the 8 B of the
ciphertext, 4 B of the IV, and 4 B of the authentication tag
(computed over the first two values); the total length is 16 B.
Note that the keys used for encryption (kA′) and authentication
(kA′′) are different; however, they can be derived from the
secret key of the AS (kA).
2) MS Implementation: The MS generates EphIDs accord-
ing to the procedure in Figure 3. For asymmetric cryptography,
we use cryptographic primitives based on Curve25519 [9],
which is proven to have high performance and features small
public-keys (32 B) and small signatures (64 B). Key exchange
is done using the elliptic-curve variant of Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH). To create digital signatures for certificates, we use
the ed25519 signature scheme [10] and the ed25519 SUPER-
COP REF10 implementation2. For symmetric cryptographic
operations, we leverage Intel AES-NI [16] – a new encryption
instruction set. Furthermore, we implement the host database
(host in f o) that stores the shared keys between hosts and the
AS as a hashtable using HID as the key.
As an optimization, we parallelize the EphID generation by
using 4 processes to simultaneously handle EphID requests.
The parallelization is straightforward since the generation does
not require any coordination (e.g., shared memory or inter-
process communication) between the processes. However,
no other optimizations were performed (e.g., optimizing the
ed25519 REF10 implementation).
3) MS Performance Evaluation: We demonstrate the effi-
ciency of generating per-flow EphIDs. To this end, we need
statistics for the peak flow generation rate inside an AS.
We use a 24-hour packet trace of HTTP(S) traffic from
a major network provider that manages network connections
to universities and research facilities in an European country.
2http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html
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    Source AID              4 Bytes
    Source EphID        16 Bytes
    Dest EphID            16 Bytes
    Dest AID                  4 Bytes
    MAC                        8 Bytes
    Total                       48 Bytes
LengthField
HID
ExpTime
IV
MAC
  4 Bytes
  4 Bytes
  4 Bytes
  4 Bytes
Total 16 Bytes
Fig. 7: APNA Header Information and EphID Field Lengths.
The trace contains over 104 million and 74 million entries for
HTTP(S) traffic respectively. Each entry contains a timestamp
and anonymized source/destination IDs. We identify 1,266,598
unique hosts generating a peak rate of 3,888 active HTTP(S)
sessions per second.
We test our implementation on a desktop machine with an
Intel Core i5-3470s CPU (4 cores, 2.9GHz) and 4 GB of DDR3
memory. For 500,000 EphID requests, our implementation
runs for 6.9 seconds. On average, 13.7µs are needed for a
single EphID generation, translating to a generation rate of
72.8k EphIDs/sec — over 18 times higher than the request
rate. Our experiment shows that even a low-end desktop
machine can keep up with the traffic demands of a real AS
that has over 1.2 million hosts.
B. Border Router
We describe our border router prototype starting with the
structure of the network header. Then, we describe the border
router implementation and evaluate the forwarding perfor-
mance.
1) APNA Header Information: The network header infor-
mation (Figure 7) contains the source and destination end
points (expressed as AID:EphID tuples) and a MAC over the
packet’s content. We use 4 B to express the AID since 4 B are
used for AS numbers in the Internet; the EphID field requires
16 B as described in Section V-A1; the MAC field requires
8 B. The fields in the packet header sum up to 48 B.
2) Border Router Implementation: Our border router per-
forms additional processing compared to traditional IPv4/IPv6
forwarding (Figure 4). Namely, the border router additionally
performs one decryption, two table lookups, and one MAC
verification.
We use DPDK [1] as our packet processing platform, which
allows us to implement the required functionality in userspace.
The decryption of the EphID in the packet is implemented
through Intel AES-NI [16].
3) Forwarding Performance Evaluation: We evaluate the
forwarding performance on a commodity server with two Intel
Xeon E5-2680 CPUs and two non-uniform memory access
(NUMA) nodes; each NUMA node has four banks of 8 GB
DDR3 RAM. The server is equipped with 6 dual-port 10 GbE
NICs, providing a total capacity of 120 Gbps. To generate
traffic, we use Spirent-SPT-N4U-220 [2] connected back-to-
back with the server. The server receives the traffic, processes
it, and sends it back to the generator.
We perform a throughput experiment for 5 different packet
sizes — 128, 256, 512, 1024, and 1518-byte packets. The
results (Figure 8) confirm that we are able to perform the
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Fig. 8: Forwarding performance expressed as (a) packet-rate
and (b) bit-rate.
required additional processing without incurring a throughput
penalty. The measured performance matches the theoretical
maximum performance; we omit this performance line for
demonstration purposes since the two lines match. Figure 8(a)
shows that even for small packet sizes (i.e., high packet-rates),
the border router performs optimally. Figure 8(b) shows that
as packet sizes increase, we saturate the capacity of 120 Gbps.
The border router performs optimally because the additional
operations are lightweight. The border router’s CPUs have ad-
equate capacity to perform this processing without degrading
performance for the given packet rates. Under higher packet
rates, the heavier load would start to degrade forwarding
performance slightly.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We demonstrate how APNA prevents attacks that undermine
source accountability and data privacy.
A. Attacking Source Accountability
An adversary attacking source accountability (Section II-A)
has three attack vectors at hand.
EphID Spoofing. The adversary can attempt to use an
EphID that is issued to another host (the spoofed victim). For
instance, an adversary that shares the same access port with
the victim can sniff traffic and observe valid EphIDs that are in
use. However, using such an EphID is not sufficient since every
outgoing packet has to contain a MAC that is computed with
the shared key between the host and the host’s AS. Without
the corresponding shared key, the adversary cannot create valid
MACs, resulting in spoofed packets that are dropped by the
host’s AS (additionally making the attack visible). Obtaining
the shared key requires compromising the host: the shared
key is generated with a DH key exchange between the host
and the Registry Server (Figure 2), which means that the
adversary needs the DH private value that is used for the
EphID generation; our adversary model does not account for
a compromised host.
An active adversary can attempt to obtain an EphID by
pretending to be another host. However, such an attack is
infeasible: the adversary not only needs to learn the control
EphID (E phIDctrlh ) of the victim, but also needs to learn the
shared key between the victim and the source AS.
Unauthorized EphID Generation. The adversary can at-
tempt to create an unauthorized EphID. However, such an
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attempt is not feasible since the EphID construction (Figure 6)
is CCA-secure.
We achieve a CCA-secure encryption scheme through two
primitives. First, we use symmetric encryption in counter mode
with a fresh IV for every encryption; this encryption is secure
under a chosen plaintext attack. Second, we use a CBC-MAC
scheme to authenticate the concatenation of the ciphertext
and the IV. Note that our use of the CBC-MAC is secure
against chosen plaintext attacks since the input length to the
CBC-MAC is fixed to 16 B.3. The combination of these two
primitives results in CCA-secure encryption scheme [7].
Identity Minting. A common attack against systems that
provide accountability is identity minting, whereby a malicious
host attempts to create multiple (unauthorized) identities. In
APNA, since host identifiers (HIDs) are generated by the
AS and assigned only to the hosts that have authenticated,
the hosts cannot independently create multiple identifiers. In
addition, if a host requests a new HID, the previous HID and
all associated EphIDs are revoked by the AS. Thus, at any
moment every host on the network is identified by a single
HID.
B. Attacking Privacy
An adversary attacking data privacy can attempt to eaves-
drop on communication data or store it and decrypt it once he
obtains the encryption keys. In APNA, traffic is encrypted by
default and our scheme achieves perfect forward secrecy: The
symmetric key that is used for data encryption is bound to
the EphID (and the public/private key pair for that EphID)
that is used for the corresponding communication session.
This key pair is not used to derive other encryption keys and
is not derived from other long-term private keys (K−AS, K−H ).
Hence, only the compromise of a private key for an EphID
compromises data privacy and only for the communication
session that uses this EphID.
Alternatively, an AS-level adversary can actively try to
compromise data privacy of a customer host through a MitM
attack. The malicious AS can perform a MitM attack during
the shared key establishment between the victim (E phIDv) and
a peer host (E phIDp). In this attack the malicious AS replaces
the certificate for the EphID of the victim host (CE phIDv ) with
another (fake) certificate, pretending to be the victim host to
the peer host; the peer host accepts CE phIDv . However, the
AS cannot deceive the victim by pretending to be the peer
host because it cannot generate the certificate for E phIDp
(CE phIDp) that is signed by the private key of the peer host’s
AS. Consequently, the connection is not established and the
adversary cannot read any communication of the hosts. The
MitM attack is only possible if the source and destination ASes
collude, which we do not consider in our model.
For communication between two hosts in the same AS (i.e.,
intra-domain communication), APNA does not provide any
privacy guarantee from the AS: the identities of the two hosts
are already known to the AS (compromising host privacy), and
3CBC-MAC is insecure for variable-length messages [6].
the AS can perform MitM attacks to decrypt communication
between the hosts (compromising data privacy) as the AS can
fake both certificates for the EphIDs that the hosts use. The
two hosts can use security protocols in higher layers (e.g.,
TLS) to encrypt the content of the communication.
C. Other Attacks
Unauthorized Shutoff Requests. The shutoff protocol can
be misused to perform a denial-of-service attack against a host.
To prevent such an attack, three measures are implemented to
prevent unauthorized shutoff requests. First, only the destina-
tion host and destination AS are authorized to issue a shutoff
request. Furthermore, the shut-off requester has to present the
unwanted packet that proves that the source has indeed sent the
packet. Since every packet has been cryptographically marked
by the source AS, the destination cannot make a shutoff
request with a rogue packet. Lastly, the shutoff requester
must present its authorization credentials—it needs to sign
the request message with the private key associated with
the destination EphID, and include the corresponding short-
lived certificate in the request message, proving that it is an
authorized party.
DDoS Attacks on Hosts. The architecture provides intrinsic
defense against DDoS attacks for three reasons. 1) Since
spoofing the source identifier is difficult, reflection DDoS
attacks (e.g., DNS reflection) are difficult to launch. 2) The
shutoff protocol allows the victim to suppress unwanted traffic.
3) Due to strong accountability, the victim can ask the AS
of malicious host to take action against the host behind the
EphIDs that are generating a lot of DDoS attack traffic.
VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. DNS Registration
Today, the names of publicly accessible services (e.g., an
online shopping website) are typically registered to public
DNS servers. In APNA, the servers that host such services
publish the EphID to a public DNS server, and the DNS
server returns the EphID with the corresponding certificate
for a requested domain name. To this end, the server performs
two tasks: 1) it requests an EphID and the associated certificate
from its AS; and 2) it registers the certificate under the domain
name to DNS;4 the registered EphID will be used as the
destination address in future communication.
Publishing certificates to the DNS raises a problem: a
shutoff request against a published EphID would terminate
any ongoing communication sessions that use this EphID. A
naı¨ve solution is to update the DNS entry with a new EphID
whenever the published EphID becomes invalid. However,
this would become burdensome for the DNS infrastructure if
attackers continuously issue shutoff requests against a domain.
Our solution is to define receive-only EphIDs—EphIDs
that are used only to receive packets and are never used as
the source EphIDs. Since they are never used as the source
identifier, they cannot become the target of shutoff requests. To
4We assume DNSSec to authenticate DNS records.
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avoid using receive-only EphIDs as the source identifier, the
communication establishment to a server needs to be changed
(i.e., the server does not respond to the client using the receive-
only EphID).
Client-Server Connection Establishment. To support
receive-only EphIDs by the server, the connection establish-
ment procedure in Section IV-D1 is extended. To simplify the
narrative, assume that the client uses E phIDc to connect to
the server, and that the server uses E phIDr as the receive-
only EphID and E phIDs to serve the client.
After obtaining E phIDr from DNS, the client contacts
the server using E phIDc and E phIDr as the source and
destination EphIDs, respectively. The server verifies the short-
lived certificate of E phIDc and computes a shared key that
will be used to encrypt data packets between the client and the
server. However, instead of using the short-lived certificate of
E phIDr, the server uses the short-lived certificate of E phIDs
to compute the shared key. Then in the response message to the
client, the server includes the short-lived certificate of E phIDs
to inform the client that E phIDs will be used by the server to
serve the client.
The client verifies the short-lived certificate of E phIDs and
computes the shared key using the certificates for E phIDs and
E phIDc. In addition, the client uses E phIDs as the destination
EphID to communicate to the server.
Protecting DNS Queries. Using the certificates for the
two EphIDs (i.e., E phIDc and E phIDr), DNS queries are
encrypted just like any other data communication. Hence, only
the DNS server and the host knows the content of the query
(e.g., domain name). However, if the DNS server is operated
by the host’s AS, the AS can compromise the privacy of the
DNS query—the AS knows the identity of the host from the
EphID and retrieves the content of the query from the DNS
server. To prevent such a compromise, the host can use a DNS
server that he trusts and that is not operated by the AS that
he resides in.
DNS Poisoning. A malicious AS can poison its local
DNS servers with rogue entries. When the victim attempts to
connect to a certain domain, the AS can successfully launch
a MitM attack. We do not explicitly address DNS security
since it is not a network-layer issue. With APNA, users can
securely communicate with a trusted DNS server of their
choice, avoiding their AS.
B. Hosts Behind Connection-Sharing Devices
In the Internet, connection sharing devices (e.g., NAT)
are often used. For example, DSL or cable modems often
have wireless Access Point functionality that allows multiple
devices (e.g., laptops, smart phones) to connect to the Internet;
and, Internet cafe´s share their Internet connection and make it
accessible to their customers. In this section, we describe two
approaches that embrace connection-sharing devices in APNA.
For brevity, a connection sharing devices is referred to as an
Access Point (AP).
Bridge-mode. In this approach, the AP serves as a transpar-
ent bridge that interconnects users behind the AP to the AS.
The AS requires all users to be directly authenticated to itself.
In this approach, the AS needs to authenticate every single
user, even those that may stay in the AS network for only a
short period of time. Alternatively, the AS can delegate the
management of connection sharing to the corresponding APs.
NAT-mode. In this approach, the AP creates a small domain
of its own while acting as a host to the AS network. That is,
the AP performs the protocol described in Section IV as a host
to the AS while playing the roles of a RS, an MS, a router,
and an accountability agent on behalf of its clients.
As a RS, the AP bootstraps the hosts into the AP’s internal
network: it authenticates the hosts to the internal network,
negotiates shared keys that are used to authenticate the packets
that the hosts send, and provides bootstrapping information.
As an MS, the AP makes EphID requests on behalf of its
hosts to the AS. The procedure that the AP follows to acquire
EphIDs for its hosts is similar to the EphID issuance protocol
described in Figure 3, but with two differences. First, when
requesting for an EphID to the MS of the AS, the AP uses an
ephemeral public key that is supplied by its host. Second, the
AP keeps track of the EphIDs that are assigned to the hosts
as a list, i.e., E phID in f o (as opposed to deriving HIDs from
EphIDs) since EphIDs are encrypted using the AS’s secret
key and EphIDs contain HIDs assigned to the AP, not to its
hosts. This list is used to identify the hosts using EphIDs in
the packets.
As a router, the AP implements the data forwarding proce-
dures described in Figure 4, but with two differences. First,
instead of parsing the EphIDs to determine the HID of the
host, the AP uses the E phID in f o list. Second, for outgoing
packets, in addition to verifying the MAC in the packets using
the shared keys with its hosts, the AP replaces the MAC using
its shared key with the AS before forwarding the packets to
the AS.
Finally, as an accountability agent, the AP identifies the
misbehaving hosts based on EphIDs. Since the hosts behind
an AP are not visible to the AS and since the AS issues EphIDs
to the AP not to the hosts, the AS holds the AP accountable
for misbehaving EphIDs. Then, the AP determines the host
that is using the misbehaving EphID.
C. Connection Establishment Latency
In Section IV-D1, we described how two hosts establish a
connection with each other: using the short-lived certificates
for the two EphIDs, the two hosts compute the symmetric
shared key that is used for data encryption. The connection
establishment requires one Round Trip Time (RTT) before
any communication can take place; however, this RTT can
be eliminated. On the very first packet of the connection
establishment, the host encrypts its data after computing the
shared key. Then, the receiving host decrypts the data after
computing the shared key.
In the case of client-server communication, the connection
establishment (described in Section VII-A) requires 1.5 RTTs,
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but this latency can be reduced to 0 or 0.5 RTT depending on
the desired level of data privacy. If the client encrypts data on
the first packet using the shared key between her EphID and
the receive-only EphID of the server, the client incurs zero
RTT in connection establishment. However, if an adversary
compromises the private key of the receive-only EphID, the
adversary can decrypt the first packets of all communication
sessions with the server. The compromise of the first packets
is eliminated if a client does not send data on the first packet;
however, this incurs latency penalty of 0.5 RTT.
D. Deployment in the Internet
Although our ideas are not restricted to a certain Internet
architecture, APNA can be used in today’s Internet. To this
end, the Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol [14],
which uses the IPv4 network as virtual Point-To-Point (PTP)
links to encapsulate various network protocols (e.g., tunneling
IPv6 sites over IPv4 network) can be used. In APNA, GRE en-
capsulation can interconnect two APNA entities, e.g., between
two APNA routers over IPv4 network.
Upper Layer (UL) Header
GRE Header
Payload
!"#$%&'()'*
Protocol = GRE
Protocol Type = APNA
APNA Header
Protocol = UL
Fig. 9: APNA Packet Structure.
Figure 9 shows the APNA packet structure using the GRE
protocols. The source and destination addresses of the IPv4
header are that of the two APNA entities that are sending
and receiving the APNA packet. The APNA header and the
data payload follow the GRE tunnel header; the GRE tunnel
specifies the encapsulated network protocol using the Protocol
Type field. Since the GRE protocol uses the EtherType num-
bers for identifying the encapsulated protocol, we would need
to request a dedicated EtherType number from IANA.
IPv4 addresseses of the hosts serve as the HIDs in the IPv4
deployment. Note that IPv4 addresses and HIDs are both four
bytes long, and IPv4 addresses are uniquely assigned to hosts
in an AS. In addition, IPv4 addresses of APNA routers serve
as AIDs so that inter-domain routing continues to be based on
IPv4 addresses.
For intra-domain forwarding in the source AS, the source
host puts its IP address and the IP address of an APNA router
as the source and destination addresses in the IPv4 header (that
comes before the GRE header), respectively. For intra-domain
forwarding in the destination AS, an APNA router 1) decrypts
the destination EphID in the APNA header to get the HID
(i.e., IPv4 address) of the destination host; and, 2) replaces
the destination IPv4 address of the IPv4 header with the HID.
This intra-domain forwarding has a privacy implication.
Within the source and destination ASes, the addresses of the
hosts are visible; hence, it is not possible to provide any
privacy guarantee against an adversary who observes packets
within the ASes. However, once an AS fully deploys APNA
(i.e., all routers forward packets based on EphIDs), this privacy
implication disappears.
For inter-domain forwarding in the source AS, a APNA
router replaces the addresses in the IPv4 header of the APNA
packet with its IPv4 address and the destination AID as the
new source and destination addresses, respectively. For all
transit ASes, the packet is forwarded based on the destination
address in the IPv4 header.
APNA Gateway. Making modifications to the host network
stack is an onerous task that hampers deployment of novel
architectures. Hence, we propose using APNA gateways to
bridge between the Internet and APNA without having to
change the host network stack. An APNA gateway has two
roles: 1) as an APNA host, it runs the protocols described
in Section IV; and 2) as a packet translator, it converts
between native IPv4 and APNA packets. Assuming that the
gateway uses different source EphID for different IPv4 flows,
the challenge in translating between IPv4 and APNA packets
is determining the mapping between IPv4 flow information
(identified by the standard 5-tuple) in IPv4 packets and
APNA flow information (identified by source and destination
AID:EphID pair) in APNA packets.
When forwarding an outgoing IPv4 packet from a host to
an APNA router, the gateway converts the IPv4 packet to a
APNA packet. IPv4 addresses in the APNA packet can be
easily determined: the addresses of the gateway and the APNA
router are used as the source and destination IP addresses,
respectively. In addition, the source AID:EphID information
in the APNA header can be easily determined: for each new
IPv4 flow, the gateway uses a different EphID. However,
determining the destination AID:EphID is not trivial. In fact,
the gateway cannot determine the destination AID:EphID
solely based on the 5-tuple information in the IPv4 packet
from the host.
Instead, the gateway has to rely on mechanisms that the host
uses to find its peer host. For instance, a client may use DNS
that stores the short-lived certificate and the IPv4 address of
the server. The gateway that serves the client learns the IPv4
address and the AID:EphID of the server by inspecting the
DNS reply to the client. Then, the gateway uses the destination
IPv4 address in the IPv4 packets from the client to the server
to get AID:EphID of the server.
Note that the gateway can automatically learn the IPv4
address to AID:EphID mapping only if the host uses a well-
known mechanisms (e.g., DNS). Otherwise, the host needs to
statically configure the mapping between peer’s IPv4 address
and the AID:EphID pair into the gateway.
In the above client-server communication example, one may
argue that the host privacy of the server is lost since its IPv4
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address is registered in DNS. To overcome such privacy loss,
the IPv4 address can be removed from the DNS record. When
the client’s gateway sees the DNS reply, it generates and
appends a random IPv4 address into the DNS reply. Then,
based on the destination IPv4 address in the client’s packets
to the server, the gateway determines the AID:EphID of the
server.
When forwarding an incoming APNA packet from an
APNA router to a host, the gateway needs to convert it to an
IPv4 packet by choosing appropriate source and destination
IPv4 addresses. If the gateway already has the mapping
between the APNA flow tuple and the IPv4 flow tuple (i.e.,
the receiving host has sent an outgoing packet with the IPv4
flow tuple), the gateway uses the IPv4 flow tuple to create the
IPv4 packet. If the gateway does not have the mapping, the
gateway needs to carefully choose the source and destination
IPv4 addresses for the IPv4 packet.
When choosing the source address, the gateway needs to
ensure that the host can distinguish between different flows.
That is, every APNA flow tuple must be mapped to a unique
IPv4 flow tuple. If the gateway uses its IPv4 address as the
source address in the IPv4 packet, two different APNA flows
may have the same 5-tuple information when they use the same
source port number. Alternatively, we define a virtual end-
point which consists of an IPv4 address (e.g., randomly drawn
from a private address space), and the source port number in
the transport header in the APNA packet. The gateway assigns
unique virtual end-point for each APNA flow, and the IPv4
address of the virtual end-point is used as the source IPv4
address in the IPv4 packet.
To determine the destination IPv4 address, the gateway
uses the destination EphID information in the APNA header.
However, the mapping between EphID and IPv4 address exists
only if the destination has sent an outgoing packet or the
destination host has registered the mapping between its EphID
and IPv4 address. For example, a server administrator registers
a (receive-only EphID, IP address)-tuple to his gateway after
registering his domain information in DNS.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Ephemeral ID Granularity
Thus far, we have argued that APNA does not impose the
granularity at which EphIDs should be used and we have
shown that the EphIDs can be generated at high speed (See
Section V-A3). In this section, we present four granularities at
which EphIDs can be used.
Per-Flow Ephemeral ID. This is the typical use case where
a host uses different EphIDs for different flows. There are
two advantages to per-flow EphIDs. It prevents an observer’s
attempt to identify a common sender of multiple flows by
inspecting the content of the packets (i.e., APNA header and
payload). Shut-off incidents have limited impact on a host. It
terminates the flow that uses the reported EphID as the source;
however, all other flows remain intact. The disadvantage of this
case is that a host needs to acquire and manage EphIDs for
every new flow.
Per-Host Ephemeral ID. On one end of the spectrum, a
host uses a single EphID for all packets. The advantage of this
model is that a host only needs to acquire and manage one
EphID. However, there are two drawbacks. Since all packets
have the same source EphID, all packets are linked to a
common sender. Shut-off incident terminate all connections
from the host.
Per-Packet Ephemeral ID: A host could use different
EphIDs per each packet. Hence, it would be difficult to link
different packets even to a single flow, providing the strongest
privacy guarantee. However, even the destination host cannot
demultiplex packets into flows based on the APNA headers in
the packets. An additional protocol is necessary to demultiplex
packets [23].
Per-Application Ephemeral ID. An EphID can be used to
represent all packets that are generated by an application or
a service that is running on the host. This EphID granularity
facilitates managing traffic that are generated by an applica-
tion. For example, if an AS enforces its hosts to use per-
application EphIDs, the AS and its hosts could collaboratively
identify malicious applications (e.g., DDoS bot application)
that are running at the hosts. The network identifies malicious
activities (e.g., creating flooding attacks) to a source EphID
and inform the host about the EphID; then the host identifies
the application that uses the EphID and takes appropriate
actions.
B. Support for ICMP
In APNA, ICMP is available by default in most cases
because the source host can be reached using the source EphID
that is present in host’s packets5. Hence, using the source
EphID in a packet, one can send an ICMP message to the
source host.
Sending an ICMP message follows the same procedure as
sending a data packet to another host. An entity (e.g., router
or host) that wishes to send an ICMP message uses one of
its EphID as the source address in the packet and computes
the MAC using the shared key with its AS. APNA offers
privacy and accountability for the ICMP messages: identity
of the entity remains hidden except to its AS, and the packet
is authenticated by the AS. Consequently, if an ICMP message
is deemed to be faulty by the receiving host, he can hold the
ICMP message sender accountable for the message via the AS
of the sender.
Unlike data communication between two hosts, however,
the payload of ICMP messages are not encrypted. Encrypting
the payload is difficult because the ICMP message sender
cannot easily obtain the short-lived certificate of the source
EphID in the original message that have prompted the ICMP
message. One naive approach is to store short-lived certificates
of all flows that the (ICMP message) sender sees; however,
this approach incurs a lot of storage overhead to the sender.
5If the source EphID expires immediately after the packet leaves the source
AS, the source EphID becomes invalid. However, we expect such case to occur
infrequently.
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As our future work, we are exploring ways to encrypt ICMP
messages without imposing excessive overhead to the ICMP
message sender.
C. Strengthening the Shutoff Protocol
If designed incorrectly, the shutoff protocol can be abused as
a tool to perform DoS attacks against benign hosts. Thus, it is
important to correctly identify the entities that are authorized
to perform a shut-off.
In Section IV-E, we restricted the authorized parties as the
destination host and AS since these are the only two parties
that will provably receive the packet based on the APNA
header. However, there are proposals to encode the forwarding
paths into the packets (e.g., Packet Passport [25], ICING [29],
and OPT [22]). When such proposals are combined with our
architecture, the list of authorized entities can be extended
to include on path-ASes (or their routers), strengthening the
shut-off protocol.
D. Handling Replay Attacks
A malicious entity that aims to “harm” a source host
may replay packets of the source. In the short-term, replayed
packets may induce shutoff incidents against the source host,
disrupting communication of the source; and in the long-term,
the AS of the source host may take retributive action against
the source host for repeated shutoff incidents.
Replay attacks can be prevented by making every packet
unique. That is, a nonce field is added to the APNA header
(Figure 7), and a source host puts a unique number for each
generated packet. Then, the destination host performs replay
detection based on the nonces in the packets and discards all
duplicate packets.
Ideally replayed packets should be filtered near replay
location, but this requires routers in the network to perform
replay detection. Designing a practical in-network replay de-
tection mechanism that does not affect routers’ forwarding
performance is not trivial; it is our future work to design such
a mechanism.
E. APNA-as-a-Service
An ISP can offer APNA’s accountability and privacy protec-
tion not only to hosts in its network, but also to its downstream
(e.g., customer) ASes. In this deployment, a downstream AS
can be viewed as a connection-sharing device that provides
APNA connections to its hosts. Then the downstream AS can
work as a transparent bridge or NAT to connect its customers
to the ISP (See Section VII-B for details).
APNA-as-a-Service offers benefits to both the ISP and the
downstream ASes. The ISP can expand its APNA customer
base beyond its network. However, note that the ISP can
only offer APNA-as-a-Service to ASes whose packets must
go through the ISP. This restriction is necessary since the
ISP needs to be able to verify all packets that are originating
from the downstream ASes to act as the accountability agent.
The customer ASes, especially the small ASes that do not
have a large number of hosts (i.e., small anonymity set), can
enjoy stronger level of host privacy protection by mixing with
customers of other (upstream) ISPs.
However, there are challenges in deploying APNA-as-a-
Service. For example, authentication process of the end-hosts
become more complicated since the hosts of the downstream
AS may need to authenticate remotely. In addition, routing
in the downstream ASes become complex, especially for the
ASes that are multi-homed (e.g., managing EphIDs). As our
future work, we are investigating the challenges associated
with offering APNA-as-a-Service.
F. Interaction with TLS
APNA by design addresses network layer security issues:
(1) it prevents source spoofing by imposing strict authentica-
tion of packets; and (2) it provides communication privacy by
hiding the identities of communicating parties and supporting
pervasive end-to-end encryption. However, APNA does not
deal with security issues at higher layers (e.g., authenticating
domain ownership).
APNA can work in conjunction with security protocols that
deal with security issues at higher layers. For example, TLS
can be implemented on top of the encrypted end-to-end path
between two hosts to perform user authentication. However,
not all functionalities of upper layer security protocol may be
necessary. For instance, since APNA already provides a secure
end-to-end channel between hosts, the mechanism to establish
a symmetric shared key for data encryption may be omitted
when implementing TLS on top of APNA.
G. Parameter Considerations
1) Expiration Time for EphIDs: There are multiple factors
to consider when deciding the expiration time for EphIDs and
the associated short-lived certificates: it should be sufficiently
long so that an EphID does not expire before the communi-
cation that uses the EphID terminates. At the same time, it
should be kept short so that EphID does not last long beyond
the end of the communication.
If EphIDs are used per flow, the expiration time can be set to
15 minutes as 98% of the flows in the Internet last less than
15 minutes [11]. Alternatively, the EphID Issuance protocol
(Section IV-C) can be extended to allow hosts to express their
choice of expiration time. For instance, an AS may specify
three categories (short-term, medium-term, long-term EphIDs)
to accommodate diverse nature of flow duration time.
2) Managing Revoked EphIDs: EphIDs can be preemp-
tively revoked before they expire: a host could revoke an
EphID that is no longer needed, or an EphID could have been
subjected to a shutoff incident. Regardless of the reason for
revoking EphIDs, border routers in the ASes need to store a
list of revoked EphIDs (i.e., revoked E phIDs in Figure 4). If
there are too many revocations in an AS, it burdens the border
routers since the size of the revoked E phIDs would become
large.
There are two ways to manage the size of revoked E phIDs
list. First, since EphIDs will expire over time and packets
using expired EphIDs are dropped, the expired EphIDs can be
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removed from revoked E phIDs. Second, if too many EphIDs
of a host are revoked, AS should view it as a sign of malicious
activity by the host. In such event, AS revokes the HID of the
host invalidating all EphIDs that are issued to the host, and
AS assigns a new HID to the host. In addition, the AS can
contact the host for corrective measures.
Such measures against malicious hosts by the ASes are not
radical. Already in today’s Internet, ISPs that participate in
Copyright Alert System (CAS) [3] actively take actions against
the customers who repetitively upload copyrighted contents
illegally: a customer receives warnings up to 6 reported
incidents of illegal uploads, and on the 7th incident, his ISP
take actions against the customer (e.g., temporarily reduce
connection bandwidth, take educational course about copyright
laws). In APNA, an AS can set a maximum number of EphIDs
that can be preemptively revoked for each host. Then if a host
exceeds the maximum number, the AS can take actions against
the host.
H. Governments and Communication Privacy
Although generally perceived as a threat on communication
privacy, there are legitimate reasons for governments to subvert
communication privacy (e.g., to monitor terrorist activities). In
fact, many governments by law mandate ISPs to keep record of
their Internet traffic (e.g., source and destination IP addresses,
payload of the packets, etc).
APNA protects communication privacy making mass
surveillance difficult; however, at the same time, it allows
entities, such as a government, to deanonymize communication
when necessary. With the cooperation of an AS, a government
can deanonymize the identity of hosts from EphIDs. Further-
more, if the government has cooperation from the ASes in
which communicating hosts reside, the AS could decrypt on-
going communication by performing a MitM attack. However,
the government cannot simply collect packets in the Internet
to observe communication since packets are encrypted (i.e.,
making mass surveillance difficult). In addition, since APNA
achieves perfect forward secrecy, governments cannot decrypt
all communication of a host, even if after compromising the
long-term public key of the host.
IX. RELATED WORK
Persona [26] is the first proposal to introduce the idea of
balancing privacy and accountability at the network layer.
The source ISP replaces the IP address of each outgoing
packet with another address from an assigned pool. Although
this approach hides the source’s identity, it breaks the notion
of flow and prevents the destination from demultiplexing
connections.
Accountable and Private Internet Protocol (APIP) [30] pro-
poses an architecture that balances accountability and privacy
at the network layer. In APIP, the source address in the network
header is replaced with the address of an accountability
delegate that vouches for the source’s packets. The return
address can then be specified at a higher layer – invisible
from the network – protecting the source’s privacy. Senders are
expected to brief each packet to their accountability delegate
such that on-path devices can request a “vouching proof” from
the corresponding delegate.
APIP balances privacy and accountability at the network
layer, but it comes with certain limitations. APIP’s notion of
privacy is limited to sender-flow unlinkability, leaving data
privacy and the associated challenges (e.g., key distribution,
management, and establishment) unaddressed. Our proposal
presents a holistic architecture that addresses these constraints
and by default supports data privacy. Furthermore, the design
of APIP precludes every packet from being accounted for
in the network: it is possible for a malicious host to omit
reporting packets to its accountability delegate when the flow
for those packets has been “whitelisted”.6 In APNA, every
packet is linked to its sender since a MAC is computed
using the shared key between the AS and the host for every
packet (Section IV-D). Second, masking the return address
complicates getting messages from the network back to the
source—the messages must be redirected through the ac-
countability delegate of the source; the complexity of this
functionality remains unaddressed. APNA allows the network
to send messages directly to the source while preserving host
privacy and the accountability properties (Section VIII-B).
Source Accountability: The Accountable Internet Protocol
(AIP) [4] treats source accountability as a central architectural
principle. In AIP, self-certifying IDs and a shutoff protocol
(implemented by smart Network Interface Cards) are used
to identify and block malicious sources. Our architecture
uses self-certifying IDs in an anonymity-preserving way and
delegates the shutoff functionality to the source domain.
In Passport [25], OPT [22] and ICING [29], Message
Authentication Codes are used for each AS on the end-to-
end path, allowing on-path ASes to verify the authenticity of
packets.
Bender et al. [8] were first to introduce the concept
of accountability agents in their Accountability-as-a-Service
(AaaS) proposal. However, AaaS does not address privacy
considerations and requires symmetric keys between all AS
pairs.
Host Privacy and Anonymity: Raghavan et al. [33] pro-
pose ISP-wide NATs to hide the hosts’ identities from entities
in other ASes. We borrow their motivation that the size of
today’s large ISPs provides sufficiently large anonymity sets.
Onion routing [34] and Mix Networks [12] by design provide
source anonymity at the cost of source accountability.
Han et al. [17] propose a cross-layer design that uses
psuedonyms to hide the user’s identity. Similar to APNA, the
proposal allows the user to choose the level of anonymity
and it uses encryption to mask the identity of the host in
network addresses. However, the proposal falls short of being
a complete architecture that balances between accountability
and privacy: it does not consider pervasive data encryption and
6Verifiers do not verify flows that have been “whitelisted,” and a sender
does not brief packets unless it is asked by its accountability delegate under
the recursive verification method (Section 5 in APIP [30]).
15
the associated challenges, such as certificate management, and
does not consider source accountability.
Data Privacy: Farrell and Tschofenig [15] argue that perva-
sive monitoring – defined as the widespread and often covert
surveillance through intrusive gathering of communication
information – is a widespread attack on privacy. In response,
Kent [20] proposes pervasive encryption as a countermeasure
against pervasive monitoring. In a related effort, the Let’s
Encrypt7 organization encourages the use of encrypted web
traffic by issuing free TLS certificates for web servers. Our
proposal does not replace transport-layer encryption, but rather
promotes pervasive encryption to a fundamental design tenet
of the network layer. In addition, we propose a concrete
solution for key distribution, establishment, and management.
MinimaLT [31] proposes an architecture that supports per-
vasive data encryption and achieves PFS at low latency;
however, MinimalLT does not consider source accountability.
In Section IV-D1, we show how our architecture supports data
privacy with PFS while enforcing source accountability.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We propose APNA, an architecture that resolves the
accountability-privacy tussle by enlisting ISPs as accountabil-
ity agents and privacy brokers. As accountability agents, ISPs
authenticate hosts and their packets into the network; and as
privacy brokers, ISPs anonymize the identities of communi-
cating parties and assist in the establishment of shared keys
for end-to-end data encryption.
By facilitating (and by enabling by default) pervasive en-
cryption between endpoints, APNA can help frustrate ad-
versaries conducting indiscriminate mass surveillance. At the
same time, APNA can assist in lawful, targeted request for
subscriber communications, since ISPs can comply with data
retention laws by storing customer to EphID bindings as
well as the packets. However, abuse of such requests for
information are minimized due to the perfect forward secrecy
of our scheme: even if host’s public key is compromised,
the secrecy and integrity of previous communications remain
untouched.
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